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1. Introduction
The past decade or two has witnessed a constellation of far-reaching changes in
production technologies, physical and human capital, and ideas about how to organize
firms. This has resulted in a fundamental restructuring of production and work in
advanced industrialized countries. The restructuring process has received a lot of
attention in the media and in the business management and sociology literatures but,
with relatively few exceptions, has gone virtually unnoticed in economics thus far.
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What is particularly striking about this process is how much of it depends on a break-
down of the traditional occupational barriers.
2
The traditional organizations required their employees to have highly
specialized skills, appropriate for standardized production processes. Sales people
needed interpersonal skills, production workers required narrow manual skills,
administrative personnel needed organizational and accounting skills, product
designers needed creativity, and managers required prudence and judgment. It is on
account of this specialization that employees could be divided into narrow
occupations and the traditional distinctions between skilled and unskilled workers
could be made. In this environment, relatively little attention was given to people’s
capacity to acquire multiple skills; if a person happens to have more than one
occupational aptitude, he generally had to decide which particular one to use and let
the rest lie fallow.
In the new types of firms emerging nowadays this separation of roles is breaking
down. Workers are often given responsibilities spanning production, administration,
training, customer relations, and even the development of products and production
                                                
1 Examples of studies where this process is described, and sometimes also recommended, are Womack,
Jones and Roos (1991), Hammer and Champy (1993), Pfeiffer (1994), Wikström and Norman (1994).
For a penetrating analysis emphasizing the complementarities of different functions in  the restructured
firms, see Milgrom and Roberts (1990). Their focus of attention differs markedly from ours, however,
in that they concentrate on changes in production technology (in terms of the rate of product
improvements, processing and delivery time, setup costs, and the like) while we emphasize changes in
the nature of work (multi-tasking in particular) and the consequences for labor market activity. See also
Appelbaum and Bott (1994), Kremer and Mishkin (1995), Mitchell , Lewin and Lowler III (1990),
Levine and Tyson (1990) and Piore and Sabel (1984).
2The business literature is replete with case studies of work being reorganized, so that people no longer
staff functional departments but rather rotate among multiple tasks in customer-oriented teams. A few
examples are ABB, the producer of heavy capital goods, Bell Atlantic, the IBM Credit Corporation,
Motorola, and the airline SAS.REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 2
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processes. The new, smaller, customer-oriented teams require versatility, cognitive
and social competence, as well as judgment. Employees involved in producing a
product are increasingly required to deal with customers, organize their production
and marketing structure, and provide ideas for product design. In addition, employees
become involved in managerial tasks, including the evaluation and supervision of
their peers, the training of new recruits, the organization of input supplies, the forming
of customer relations, and the choice of financial and accounting procedures. What
matters is not only the competence in a particular activity of production, organization,
development, and marketing, but rather all-round knowledge, potential to acquire
multiple skills, and ability to learn how the experience gained from one skill enhances
another skill, which facilitates work rotation.
In what follows, the traditional producer organizations will be called
“Tayloristic organizations”, whereas the new, integrated ones will be called “holistic
organizations”. Needless to say, we do not wish to imply that the restructuring process
is uniform throughout the economies of the world; it is certainly not true that all
Tayloristic organizations have ever greater incentives to turn into holistic ones with
the passage of time. Thus far the restructuring has taken place predominantly in the
advanced industrialized market countries, and here the development has been uneven
across the various manufacturing and service sectors. The upshot appears to have been
a greater diversity of organizations, with the overall employment opportunities at the
holistic ones growing relative to those at the Tayloristic ones. As the holistic
organizations in these countries proliferate, production activities requiring Tayloristic
organizations are often split off or contracted out to other firms in the same country or
to firms in other countries where the prevailing human and physical capital is as yet
unsuited to versatility across tasks and flexible production.
In the sectors where restructuring has occurred, it is easy to see why multi-
tasking and work rotation is central to the entire process. On the technological front,
the salient feature of the restructuring process has been the introduction of computer
technology and programmable, multi-task equipment in the manufacturing and service
sectors; the resulting improvements in production flexibility and information flows
have permitted a dramatic expansion in the number of tasks employees are able to
perform. On the business management front, the structure of control and responsibilityREORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 3
3
within firms has become flatter, as middle management is downsized and relatively
small customer-oriented teams replace the functional departments (e.g. the production,
marketing, design, finance, and administration departments) that characterized the
large, traditional firms. Whereas the traditional departments were divided by tasks, the
new teams require employees to straddle occupational lines and engage in multi-
tasking. With regard to the organization of production, the emphasis is increasingly on
shrinking the scale of production runs, reducing order-backlogs, shortening the
production cycles, reducing inventories through “just-in-time” production techniques,
and creating more opportunities for interaction between design, production, and
marketing of products. These developments also encourage firms to seek employees
with abilities spanning multiple tasks. Finally, on the marketing front, firms are
becoming increasingly responsive to customers’ needs, not only by offering broader
product lines, but also providing a wider range of ancilliary services (information,
advice, repairs, etc.) and permitting increasing customer participation in product
design. Here again multi-tasking is essential.
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For these reasons, the paper focuses on the role of multi-tasking in the
restructuring process. Section 2 analyzes the determinants of a firm’s decision to shift
from the traditional organization of work, based on extreme specialization of work
and returns to scale, to a new organization requiring greater versatility.
4 On this basis,
Section 3 presents a simple model of wage and employment determination in holistic
and Tayloristic organizations. Section 4 describes the labor market equilibrium, given
the number of holistic and Tayloristic organizations. Section 5 allows the number of
organizations to vary and examines the equilibrium in the market for organizations.
Section 6 depicts the restructuring process, whereby Tayloristic organizations turn into
holistic ones and new holistic organizations enter the economy, and it shows how this
process is responsible for the resegmentation of the labor market. Section 7 concludes.
                                                
3It is interesting to note that a number of these features - particularly the production flexibility, small
inventories, short delivery times, quick product development, widespread application of computer
technology, and a blurring of occupational boundaries - have been characteristic of many Japanese
organizations for some time.
4We also examine workers’ incentives to shift between Tayloristic and holistic sectors. The issue of
how individual firms give their employees incentives to engage in multi-tasking lies beyond the scope
of this paper; it is addressed in Lindbeck and Snower (1995c).REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 4
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2. Specialization versus Multi-Tasking
In deciding whether workers are to specialize or perform multiple tasks,
5
employers face a tradeoff between two sets of returns: (i) “returns from specialization”
whereby a worker’s productivity at a particular task increases with his exposure to that
task, and (ii) “returns from task complementarities” whereby his activity at one task
raises his productivity at another task.
The former are well-known and straightforward. In the short run, the more a
worker devotes himself to one task, without being diverted by other activities, the
more productive he will be at that task (although the returns may  generally be
expected to diminish and might eventually even turn negative). Over the long run, the
more experience a worker acquires at a task, the more adept he becomes at it, on
account of learning by doing (see Arrow (1962)).
The returns from task complementarities have received much less attention thus
far; it may be divided into what we will call “technological” and “informational” task
complementarities. The technological task complementarities are captured by the
cross-partial derivatives of the production function: just as labor and capital may be
complementary in the production process, so different occupational types of labor may
be complementary as well. To take a trivial example, the productivity of managers is
enhanced by the services of their secretaries, and the managers do not themselves have
to perform secretarial tasks for this complementarity to arise.
The  informational task complementarities arise when a worker can use the
information and skills he acquires at one task to improve his performance at another
task. These complementarities give more leverage to the technological task
complementarities. For example, when a worker is involved in sales, he gains
information about customer preferences that can be put to use when he is engaged in
production or the provision of ancillary services to the customers, or even in research
and development. Furthermore, when a worker is involved in production, he gains
information about technological processes that can be useful when he contributes to
product design. In the same vein, information gained in product development,
production and marketing can be useful in making hiring and training decisions; and
                                                
5Note that the gains from multi-tasking exploited by the worker are analogous to the economies of
scope exploited by the firm. See Baumol, Panzer, and Willig (1982).REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 5
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information gained in product repairing can help improve the customer services
ancilliary to the product.
Clearly, both the returns to specialization and the informational task
complementarities manifest themselves only with the passage of time. Since our
analysis, for simplicity, covers only a single time period, the length of this period must
be taken as sufficiently long for these returns to be able to manifest themselves.
The following model examines (a) how the decision to organize work, along
Tayloristic lines or holistic lines, depends on the returns from specialization relative to
the returns from task complementarities and (b) how recent advances in technologies
and in physical and human capital provide incentives for organizational change.
2a. Analytical Building Blocks
We capture these elements in a simple way  by  first presenting a general
formulation of the decision problem about how to organize work and then focusing on
a simple special case that highlights the basic principles. Beginning with the general
problem, consider an organization that produces an output q through i=1,...,s tasks.
6
We describe the supply technology and the organization’s profit in terms of the
following analytical building blocks.
The Output Function: Let ls i i , ,..., =1  be the labor services, in efficiency units,
devoted to the various tasks, respectively. The relation between these labor services
and the output may be summarized by the “output function”:
7q f = l ls 1,..., b g, where
fi > 0 and fii < 0 for i = 1,...,s. The technological task complementarities are depicted
by positive cross-partial derivatives fij > 0 (i = 1,...,s and  j i ¹ ); while the
informational task complementarities are covered below.
                                                
6The tasks need not be restricted to production. They could also cover product development, marketing,
or administration. The output may be thought of as a good or service, possibly combined with such
auxiliary services as distribution, customer information, and repairs.
7We refrain from calling this function a production function since it could equally well cover sales,
marketing, and so on.REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 6
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The Constituents of the Labor Services: The labor services ls i i , ,..., =1  depend on
the number of the employees providing these services, their labor endowments at the
various tasks, and the time they devote to these tasks. Let us divide the employees into
m homogeneous groups, k=1,...,m. Let each worker in the k’th group have the
following factor of labor endowments across tasks:  e e k k 1 ,..., s b g, where eik is efficiency
units of labor of a type-k worker at task i per unit of time.
Let tik be the fraction of each type-k worker’s available time devoted to task i.
Normalizing the total available time to unity,  t ik
i å =1. Furthermore, let nk be the
number of type-k workers employed by the organization. Then the total labor services
in efficiency units devoted to tasks i is lt ii k i k k
k
en = å .
The Constituents of the Labor Endowments (eik): The labor endowments, in turn, have
two determinants in our model: the “returns to specialization” (sik for the type-k
worker at task i), and the “informational task complementarity” (cik for the type-k
worker at task i): es c ik ik ik ik =x , bg , where  ¶x ¶ ¶x ¶ ik ik ik ik sc /, / bg bg > 0.
We assume that each worker has positive returns to specialization, i.e. the
greater the fraction of his working time devoted to a particular task, the more
productive he becomes at that task (i.e. the greater his labor endowment):ss ik ik ik =t bg ,
where  ¢ > sik 0. Furthermore, we assume that each worker faces positive informational
task complementarities,  i.e. the greater the fraction of his working time devoted to the
tasks  ji ¹ ,  the more information he gains about those tasks and consequently the
more productive he becomes at task i: cc j i ik ik jk =¹ t e j , where c’ik > 0.
The Organization’s Decision Problem: The revenue function may be written as
qfi =l di , where ll ll s ii = 1 ,..., ,..., bg ,   lt t i i ki ki k k
k
en = å bg ,
es c j i ik ik ik ik ik ik jk tx t t bg ej ej =¹ ( ), . Thus qq n ik k =t , di , whereREORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 7
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tt tt s ik k ik k = 1 ,..., ,..., bg ,  and nnn n kk = 1 ,..., ,..., m di . For simplicity, let the
organization’s profit be expressed as pt t k ik k ik k k nqn n ,, di di d i =- , where k nk di  are
the organization’s costs, which we assume to be independent of the workers’
allocation of time between tasks.
8
Then the organization’s decision problem is to maximize p p t = ik k n , d i with
respect to tik and nk, subject to  t ik
i å =1 for k = 1,...,m.
It turns out, however, that the basic principles governing the organization of
work can be derived quite simply in the two-by-two case in which output is produced
through two tasks, 1 and 2, performed by two types of labor, 1 and 2. This provides a
simple microfoundation for the aggregative analysis in the following section; and thus
we will concentrate on this case in what follows. In this context, multi-tasking means
that both workers do both of the available tasks (though different workers may do
them in different proportions), whereas in the general formulation each worker may of
course perform only a few of the existing tasks and different workers will commonly
perform different combinations of tasks.
In short, the output function is now simply
qf =l l 12 , b g (1)
The two types of workers will be called “type-1 workers,” whose skills give them a
comparative advantage at task 1, and “type-2 workers,” with a comparative advantage
at task 2. Simplifying the notation for this special case, let e1 and e2 be the labor
endowment for each type-1 worker at tasks 1 and 2, respectively; and let E1 and E2 be
the labor endowment of each type-2 worker at these tasks. The assumption that type-1
workers have a comparative advantage at task 1 (and, obversely, that type-2 workers
have a comparative advantage at task 2) may then be expressed as  ee EE 12 1 2 // bg b g > .
Let t be the fraction of each type-1 worker’s available time devoted to task 1,
and 1-t be the remaining fraction devoted to task 2. Similarly, let (1-T) and T be the
type-2 worker’s distribution of time between tasks 1 and 2, respectively. Furthermore,
                                                
8This assumption can be relaxed without substantially affecting our qualitative conclusions. See
Lindbeck and Snower (1995b).REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 8
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let n and N be the number of type-1 and type-2 workers employed, respectively. Then
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We write the labor endowments of the type-1 worker at tasks 1 and 2,
respectively, as
es c es c 11 1 1 22 2 2 == xx ,, b g b g   and   (3a)
and the corresponding labor endowments of the type-2 worker as
ES C ES C 11 1 1 22 2 2 == XX ,, b g b g   and   (3b)
where  ¶x ¶ ¶x ¶ ji ji sc /, / di di > 0 ,  ¶¶¶¶ XX ji j i SC /, / di di > 0 , for i,j=1,2. The returns to
specialization for each type-1 worker,
ss ss 11 22 1 == - tt b g b g   and   (4a)
where ss 120 ', '> ; and similarly for each type-2 worker,
SS SS 11 22 1 =- = TT b g b g   and   (4b)
where SS 120 ', '> . Analogously, the informational task complementarity for each type-
1 worker is
cc cc 11 22 1 =- = tt b g b g  and   (5a)
where cc 120 ', '> ; and similarly for each type-2 worker,
CC CC 11 22 1 == - TT b g b g  and   (5b)
where CC 120 ', '> .
For expositional simplicity, but without substantive loss of generality, we
assume that the comparative advantages of the type-1 and type-2 workers at the two
tasks are symmetric. Specifically, for any positive real numbers x, 01 ££ x ,  we
require sx Sx 12 b g b g = , sx Sx 21 b g b g = , cx Cx 12 b g b g = , and cx Cx 21 b g b g = , so that the
returns to specialization of type-1 worker at task 1 are identical to the returns to
specialization of type-2 worker at task 2, and similarly for the type-1 worker at task 2
and the type-2 worker at task 1. In addition, we assume that the labor services
ll 12  and   enter the output function symmetrically, i.e. for any positive number z, we
require that  fz f z ,, ll l l 21 1 2 b g b g ==  for  .



























































ne n bg bg bg bg
(6)
i.e. any increase in the time spent at a particular task raises the labor services (in
efficiency units) devoted to this task. Similarly,  ¶l ¶ ¶l ¶ 12 10 /( ) , / -> TT b g b g .
Profit: The organization’s profit is
pt t k ,,, ,,, , TT nN q nN nN b g b g b g =- (7)
On account of the symmetry assumptions above, pt p ,,, ,,, xnN x nN b g b g =T  when t
= T and n = N , i.e. the organization will distribute the type-1 and type-2 workers’
time symmetrically across the two tasks when equal number of these workers are
employed. Thus it is sufficient to examine the organization’s profit-maximizing
decision with respect to t alone, focusing our analysis entirely on the type-1 workers.
Under these assumptions, we now proceed to examine the determinants of the
Tayloristic versus holistic organization of work.
2b. The Tayloristic versus Holistic Organization of Work
Under the Tayloristic organization of work, type-1 workers specialize in task 1:
t=1; whereas under the holistic work organization, the worker performs both tasks,
9so
that 0<t<1. (Similarly, for type-2 workers, T=1 under Tayloristic organization and
0<T<1 under holistic organization; but, as noted, the analysis below need only focus
on type-1 workers.) Thus, given that the firm maximizes its profit,
10 its choice of work
organization depends wholly on the following conditions:
Given the profit function pp t = ,,, T nN b g , the profit-maximizing organization of
work is holistic (0<t*<1) whenever the following condition is fulfilled:
                                                
9Unless the worker is perfectly versatile, the two tasks will not however be performed at equal levels.
10We assume that (/) ¶p ¶t  is monotonic in t, thereby excluding the possibility of multiple interior
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and the profit-maximizing organization of work is Tayloristic (t=1) whenever this
condition is violated.
The intuition is straightforward and powerful: Since workers specialize by task
in a Tayloristic organization, the profit-maximizing allocation of time across tasks
will lie at a corner point. However, since workers in a holistic organization do not
specialize in this way, the profit-maximizing allocation of time must lie in the interior
of the feasible set.
To show in a particularly simple way how the profit-maximizing organization of
work depends on the returns to specialization and the technological and informational
task complementarities, we make some simplifying assumptions. Let 
es c s c i ii i i i i == × = x ,, , bg 12 (8)
Now define the elasticity of the returns to specialization with respect to the
fraction of time the type-1 worker devotes to the two tasks as















and define the elasticity of informational task complementarities with respect to the
fraction of time the type-2 worker devotes to the two tasks as















For expositional simplicity, we assume these elasticities to be constants.
11 Then
condition (6) holds so long as1 0 12 ++> = hh i
s
i
c i ,, for ,  and  n > 0. (The reason is




ii scn =+ + ×××> 10 ch bg .)
Then the first-order condition for the profit-maximizing allocation of time
between tasks (summarized by t) may be expressed as
                                                
11This assumption is not one of substance. Lindbeck and Snower (1995b) allow for variable elasticities,
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(12)
In this context we are now able to analyze the determinants of the restructuring
process whereby Tayloristic organizations turn into holistic ones. We conceive of this
process as being driven by two major forces, one concerning physical capital and the
other human capital.
First, recent changes in production and information technologies appear to be
strongly biased in favor of holistic organizations. The big breakthroughs in mass
production that were originally responsible for the spread of Tayloristic organizations
- such as assembly lines, specialized manufacturing equipment, organizational
networks within firms - occurred predominantly in the first part of this century. The
important recent advances - covering the introduction of computerized production,
design, product development, and information gathering processes and the adoption of
multi-purpose machine tools and programmable manufacturing equipment - favor the
holistic organizations, since they provide rapid and cheap access to information and
encourage the exercise of multiple skills, by increasing the complementarities across
different tasks.
  In terms of our model, the advances in production technology that increase the
technological task complementarities may be represented by a rise in eij for ij ¹ ,
since they increase the amount by which the marginal product fi rises in response to
                                                
12Recall that, by symmetry, n = N.REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 12
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additional labor services lj, i.e. in proportional terms, they increase
¶¶ l l ff ii j j // / bg di  for ij ¹ .
  Moreover, the advances in information technology that increase the
informational task complementarities raise the productivity of labor in task 1 when the
fraction of time devoted to task 2 is increased, i.e. in proportional terms, they increase
¶¶ t t cc 11 11 // / b gbg bg ch -- . This means that they reduce -¶ ¶ t t cc 11 // / bg b g , which is
the definition of the elasticity of the informational task complementarity. Thus, in
general, they reduce hi
c, for i = 1,2.
Second, the steady rise of human capital, produced largely by education
systems, has generated a steadily increasing supply of educated workers capable of
performing the multiple tasks required by the holistic organizations.
1314 In our model,
the advances in human capital that make workers more versatile may be represented
by an increase of sx 2 ()  relative to sx 1 () , for any positive x, 0 1 ££ x .
The profit-maximizing responses of work organization to these changes are
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In response to a sufficiently large (a) improvement in information
technology that reduces hi
c, for i = 1,2), (b) improvement in production technology
that raises eij ij , for  ¹ , and (c) improvement in the versatility of human capital that
raises sx 2 ()   relative to sx 1 () , for any positive x, 01 ££ x , Tayloristic organizations
restructure into holistic organizations.
(Proof: Suppose that initially  ¶p ¶ t
22 0 / ch > . Then a sufficiently large reduction in
hi
c, for i = 1,2, and rise in eij ij , for  ¹  will lead to  ¶p ¶ t
22 0 / ch < . But
¶p ¶ t
22 0 / ch <  is still compatible with a corner-point solution, provided that the
                                                
13These workers also have an intrinsic need to be stimulated at work and, since holistic work tends to be
more varied, creative, and challenging than the narrowly defined Tayloristic jobs, these workers are less
inclined to work for Tayloristic organizations than for holistic ones.
14A third force, that lies beyond the scope of our analysis, is a trend change in consumer preferences in
favor of more highly differentiated products. This favors holistic organizations over Tayloristic ones
since they are able to produce broader ranges of products in smaller batch sizes.REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 13
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production possibility frontier is sufficiently skewed in favor of l1. However, a
sufficiently large rise in sx 2 ()    relative to s x 1( ), for any positive x, 0 1 ££ x , will
diminish this skewness and lead to an interior solution.)
A simple way of visualizing these developments is in terms of changes in the
organization’s production possibility frontier and iso-profit curve. Specifically,
equations (2) yield a production possibility frontier in ll 12 -  space, denoted by PPF
in Figures 1. The iso-profit curve, denoted by IPC in the figure, is given by
fw n W N ll p 12 0 , bg -- - = . The organization’s problem is to choose t so as to reach
the highest iso-profit curve achievable along its production possibility frontier. In this
context, the advances in information technology make the production possibility
frontier less convex (since the slope of the frontier is  ¶l ¶t ¶l ¶t 21 // / bg bg ), and the
advances in production technology make the iso-profit curve more convex (since the
slope of this curve is -f1/f2). Furthermore, the increases in the versatility of human
capital reduces the skewness of the production possibility frontier.
Suppose that initially a Tayloristic organization of work is worthwhile, so that
the firm’s profit-maximization point for type-1 labor may be depicted by point ET  in
Figure 1a. Now observe that each of the developments discussed above helps to
transform the initial corner-point optimum into an interior optimum. Consequently the
firm’s initial profit-maximization problem eventually turns into that pictured in Figure
1b, with the optimal allocation of type-1 labor given by point EH.
Finally, the role of task complementarities and returns to specialization can be
brought into sharpest relief by examining two polar extremes of a worker’s human
capital across the two tasks: complete specialization and complete versatility:
(I) When there is complete specialization, each worker is productive only at the task in
which he has a comparative advantage: ss 12 01 0 () ( ) tt >- =  and   for type-1 workers,
and similarly type-2 workers. In this case equation (10) becomes
¶p
¶t
hh =× ++ ×× ×> fs c n
sc
11 1 1 1 10 c h bg (10’)
Since an interior optimum in the allocation of time across tasks is impossible in
this case, the organization of work will invariably be Tayloristic.REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 14
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(II) When workers are completely versatile, they are equally productive at both tasks:
sx sx Sx Sx s x 12 1 2 () () () () () ====  and cy cy Cy Cy c y 12 1 2 () () () () () === =  for any
positive x and y, 0 1 ££ xy , . Here type-1 and type-2 workers can no longer be
distinguished from one another. Then, by our assumption of symmetry,  fff 12 == ' ,
eee 11 22 == ii,  hhh 12
sss ==,  hhh 12
ccc == and eee 12 21 == ij for ij ¹ . Thus the
second-order condition (12) reduces to
¶p
¶t
hh e hh hh e hh
2





sc scn f f di bg di d i di ''
(12’)
The implications of complete versatility, contained in this equation, become
transparent in the following special cases.
Case IIa: When there are constant returns to labor (so that fij = eij = 0, for i,j = 1,2),
the organization of work depends entirely on the returns to specialization relative to
the informational task complementarities: When an increase in time at a task raises the
productivity of labor at that task by more than it raises the productivity of labor at the
other task, then work will be organized along Tayloristic lines. In other words, there
will be complete specialization when an increase in experience at a task raises the
proportional returns to specialization at that task by more than it raises the associated
informational task complementarities, i.e. when h
s + h
c > 0. Conversely, the
organization of work will be holistic when an increase in experience at a task raises
the informational task complementarities by more than the returns to specialization,
i.e. when h
s + h
c < 0. In sum:
Proposition 2a: If the marginal products of labor are constant (eij = 0 for i, j = 1,2),
then the organization of work will be holistic when h
s + h




It can be shown that when hh
sc +> 0, this production possibility frontier is
convex, as shown in Figure 2a. If eij = 0 for i, j = 1,2, then the iso-profit curve IPC is
linear in ll 12 -  space. When workers are completely versatile, the productionREORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 15
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possibility frontier is symmetric in ll 12 -  space, and by our symmetry assumption
across tasks, the iso-profit curve is symmetric in the same sense. The highest iso-profit
curve is reached at the two end-points of the production possibility frontier:
00 21 ,, ll didi  and  , which implies a Tayloristic organization of work, with t
* = 0 and
t
*
  = 1, respectively.
15
On the other hand, when hh
sc +< 0, the production possibility frontier is
concave, as illustrated in Figure 2b. Then, clearly, the highest linear iso-profit curve is
attained in the interior of the production possibility frontier, at  ll 12
** , ch  in the figure.
This  implies a holistic organization of work, with t
* = 1/2.
Case IIb: When the returns to specialization and the associated informational task
complementarities are equally responsive to changes in the fraction of available time
devoted to the relevant task, then the organization of work depends on the degree to
which tasks are technologically complementary or substitutable: In particular, if an
increase in the fraction of time devoted to a task raises the returns to specialization at
that task by the same proportional amount as the associated informational task
complementarities (hh
sc += 0), the organization of work will be Tayloristic when
the marginal product of labor service i ( i=1,2) diminishes more rapidly with labor
service j ( ji ¹ ) than with labor service i: ee ij ii < . Conversely, the organization will
be holistic when ee ij ii > . In sum,
Proposition 2b: If  hh
sc += 0, then the organization of work will be holistic when
ee ij ii >  and Tayloristic when ee ij ii < , for i j ¹ .
(Given that eii < 0, this implies of course that work will be organized along holistic
lines whenever there are technological task complementarities, so that
eij ij >¹ 0 for  .)
                                                
15Needless to say, this solution is not one of multiple equilibria. Rather, when workers are completely
versatile, type-1 and type-2 workers are identical, and thus the organization will find it worthwhile to
devote half its workforce to task 1 and the other half to task 2.REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 16
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If  hh
sc += 0, the production possibility frontier is linear; and if ee ij ii < , the
iso-profit curve is concave to the origin, as shown in Figure 2c. Thus, the highest iso-
profit curve is once again attained at the end-points of the production possibility
frontier, and workers will specialize by task. However, if ee ij ii > , the iso-profit curve
is convex to the origin, as illustrated in Figure 2d. Here the highest iso-profit curve is
reached in the interior of the a linear production possibility frontier, so that workers
engage in multi-tasking.
3. Wage and Employment Determination
Thus far we have been concerned with what determines the organization of
work, along Tayloristic or holistic lines; and for this purpose it sufficed to assume that
workers’ comparative advantages at the two tasks are symmetric: specifically,
ee E E 12 2 1 () / () () / () tt bg b g =T T  for t = T. The next step is to analyze how the
reorganization of work leads to a resegmentation of the labor market, in which the
traditional occupational (task-oriented) boundaries break down and the distinction
between versatile workers (who can perform multiple tasks) and non-versatile ones
(who can perform only one) becomes important instead. For this purpose, it now
becomes appropriate to differentiate workers in terms of their degree of versatility. For
expositional simplicity, it will be convenient to assume that workers of type i (i=1,2)
can each be divided into two distinct groups: “versatile workers” who are capable of
both tasks and “non-versatile workers” who are capable of only one.
The labor endowment of a type-1 versatile worker at task i (i = 1,2) is given by
equation (8): es c s c i ii i i i i == × = x ,, , bg 12; and analogously for the type-2 worker. The
labor endowments of the type-1 and type-2 non-versatile workers are es c 11 1 10 =× () ()
and  ES C 22 2 10 =× ( ) ( ). In words, a non-versatile type-1 worker has the endowment
that a versatile type-1 worker would have if he performed only the first task; and
similarly for the non-versatile type-2 worker.
A fixed proportion a  of the working population is able to perform task 1 and an
identical proportion is able to perform task 2. Of the groups of workers able to
perform one particular task, a fixed proportion b  is also able to perform the otherREORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 17
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task. Normalizing the aggregate size of the working population to unity, the aggregate
supply of versatile type-1 workers (A
v





12 == × ab (13a)
and the aggregate supply of non-versatile type-1 (A
s






12 1 == - × ab (13b)
Holistic organizations, clearly, require only versatile workers. The Tayloristic ones, on
the other hand, are able to use both versatile and non-versatile ones.
We assume, along the traditional lines, that the wage and employment decisions
are made in two stages: first the wage is set, taking the employment repercussions into
account; then the employment decisions are made, taking the wage as given. For
brevity, this paper focuses on the effect of work organization on employment
16 and
thus we will adopt a standard, reasonably general, model of wage determination.
Quite simply, the wage offer wj
o, for any homogenous group j of workers, is
assumed to depend positively on the reservation wage rj (that makes the workers
indifferent between employment unemployment) and negatively on the unemployment
rate uN N jj
D
j
S º- 1/ di , where  N j
D is the aggregate demand and N j
























 A wide variety of union, efficiency wage, and bargaining models yield wage
equations belonging to this broad family.
























o is the wage of the j’th group of type-2 workers, Uj is their unemployment
rate, and Rj is their reservation wage.
In line with the discussion of Section 1, we assume that versatile workers have a
higher reservation wage for Tayloristic jobs than for holistic ones. For simplicity, let
                                                
16Lindbeck and Snower (1995b) also examine how work organization influences the nature of wage
setting.REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 18
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the versatile workers’ reservation wage at Tayloristic jobs be r
+ (a constant) and all
other workers’ reservation wage be r
- (another constant), where r
+ > r
-.
Turning to the organizations’ employment decisions, note that in each
Tayloristic organization, workers specialize: the type-1 workers specialize in task 1 (t
= 1) and the type-2 workers specialize in task 2 (T = 1), so that the production
function becomes
qf sc n S C N T =× × × × 11 2 2 10 1 0 () () , () () bg b g ch (15T)
and in a holistic organization, where both types of workers perform both tasks, the
production function becomes
qf
sc n S C N
sc n S C N
H =
×- × × + - × × - ×









( ) () () ( ) () ,








where 0 < t, T  < 1.
We specify the profit functions of the Tayloristic and holistic organizations as
PY iii ii i i i i i i qw nW N n N iT H =- - - - - = yf bg bg , , (7’)
where i = T, H stands for the type of organization (Tayloristic or holistic), wi and Wi
are the real wages paid to type-1 and type-2 workers by these organizations,
17 fi  is a
fixed cost, and y ii n b g  and Yii N b g  may be interpreted as the cost of resources (e.g.
capital services, training) used in conjunction with the number of people employed,
where y ii ', ' Y> 0 , and y ii ", " Y> 0  so that as employment rises, increasingly costly
resources are brought into use. For algebraic simplicity, but without substantial loss of
generality, we assume constant returns to labor, i.e. that  ff ff 11 22 ==  and    are
constants. Inserting these constants into the profit-maximizing condition (10), we
obtain the profit-maximizing time allocation decision tt HH =
*  for holistic
organizations and t T
* =1 for Tayloristic organizations. (Recall that symmetry permits
us to focus exclusively on the type-1 workers) Given these time allocation decisions,
                                                
17Holistic organizations, as noted, employ only the versatile workers. By symmetry, the type-1 and type-
2 versatile workers have the same marginal product and the same reservation wage and thus receive the
same wage. In Tayloristic organizations the marginal products of  versatile and non-versatile type-1
workers are identical (and similarly for the type-2 workers), and we assume that these organizations pay
the same wage to workers from both groups. (Allowing them to pay different wages to versatile and
non-versatile workers would make no substantial difference to our conclusions.)REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 19
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the profit-maximizing number of people to employ in the Tayloristic and holistic






ii i i n
aw n iT H =-- = = bg 0, , (16)
where af s c f s c ii i i i i i =× × - ×+× - × × - 11 1 22 2 11 1 tt t t t t
** * * * * c h ch ch c h ch . The associated labor
demand function is
18
ng aw ii ii =- bg (16a)
where g =
- y' b g
1. By symmetry, the labor demand function for type-2 labor is
Ng A W ii ii =- bg (16b)
where  Af S C f S C iii i i i i =× × - ×+× - × × - 11 1 22 2 11 1 TT T T T T
** * * * * c h ch ch c h ch .
We now use the wage setting equations (15a) and (15b) and the labor demand
equations (16a) and (16b) to describe the equilibrium in the labor market.
4. Equilibrium in the Labor Market
We now describe the equilibrium in the labor market, taking the number of
Tayloristic organizations (FT) and the number of holistic ones (FH) as given. To
capture some salient differences between holistic and Tayloristic organizations in
practice, we parameterize our model so that, in the labor market equilibrium,
employment per Tayloristic organization exceeds employment per holistic
organization (nn N TH T H
** * * >>  and N ), and the holistic wage exceeds the Tayloristic
wage (ww WW HT HT
** ** >>  and  ). This requires that
19 (i) the fixed cost fT of operating
the Tayloristic organization must be sufficiently large relative to the fixed cost fH of
operating the holistic organization or (ii) the number of versatile workers is
sufficiently small relative to the number of non-versatile ones,  or both.
                                                
18Since non-versatile type-i workers (i=1,2) are equally productive as type-i versatile workers who
specialize at task i, the Tayloristic organization’s labor demand function for these two types of workers
is the same. The second-order conditions for profit maximization are guaranteed by yj
” ,Yj
”.
19To see these assumptions imply these two conclusions, observe that (as we will show in the next
section) the greater is the fixed cost fT relative to fH, the smaller will be the equilibrium number of
Tayloristic organizations relative to the number of holistic ones. Consequently, the larger will be the
size of the Tayloristic organization in terms of employment relative to that of the holistic organization,
and the lower will be the Tayloristic wage relative to the holistic wage. Moreover (as we show in this
section) the smaller is the holistic labor supply  relative to the Tayloristic one, the greater will be the
equilibrium holistic wage relative to the Tayloristic one.REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 20
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Since the holistic wage  is higher than the Tayloristic wage  in the labor market
equilibrium and since versatile workers have a preference for holistic over Tayloristic
work, the aggregate supply of workers
20available to the holistic firms is the aggregate
supply of versatile workers of that type, ab × . Under these circumstances, the labor
market equilibrium can be derived recursively: the holistic equilibrium may  be
computed first, and this equilibrium then determines the supply of labor to the
Tayloristic market, whose equilibrium may be derived next.
The aggregate labor market equilibrium is pictured in Figure 3. On the
horizontal axis, aggregate Tayloristic employment, LF nN TT T T
** * =×+ ch , is measured
from left to right and aggregate holistic employment, L F n N H H H H
* * * = × + c h, is
measured from right to left. Accordingly, the aggregate Tayloristic labor demand
curve ( LT
D) , wage setting curve (WST), and labor supply curve (LT
S )  are read from the
left in the figure, and the holistic labor demand curve (LH
D ), wage setting curve (WSH),
and labor supply curve (LH
S ) are read from the right.
4a. The Holistic Market
The nature of the equilibrium in the holistic market depends on the demand for
versatile workers (given by the labor demand function gH) relative to the supply of
them ( LH
S =× ab ). There are two equilibrium scenarios, the first of which is
illustrated by point H in Figure 3:
·  If the demand for versatile workers is “small” relative to the supply, the
equilibrium is given by the intersection between the labor demand curve and the
wage setting curve:
 21
                                                
20This is the supply of type-1 workers. Recall that the symmetry properties above permit us to focus just
on type-1 workers.
21 The equation number (S1H) represents “scenario 1 for the holistic market. By symmetry, the sum of
the aggregate labor demands for the type-1 and type-2 workers is equal to twice the aggregate demand




























  (where the first argument of the wage setting function is the unemployment rate of
versatile workers,  1- LL H
D
H
S / c h di  and  LH
S =× ab ).
·  If the demand for versatile workers is “large” relative to the supply, the equilibrium



















4b. The Tayloristic Market
There are three possible equilibrium scenarios for the Tayloristic labor market,
depending on the Tayloristic labor demand relative to the supply of non-versatile
workers relative to versatile ones. The first of these scenarios is illustrated by point T
in Figure 3:
·  If the demand for non-versatile workers is “small” relative to the supply, the
Tayloristic organizations do not need to hire versatile workers (who demand a
higher wage than the non-versatile workers since their reservation wage is higher),
and thus only the supply of non-versatile workers, LT
S = - × 1 a b , is relevant to
Tayloristic wage determination. Then the labor market equilibrium is given by the
intersection of the Tayloristic labor demand curve and the lower segment of the






























·  If the demand for non-versatile workers relative to the supply is in the
“intermediate” range, the Tayloristic organizations hire some, but not all, of theREORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 22
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available versatile workers. Thus the labor supply that is relevant to wage
determination in the Tayloristic market is L L T
S
H = - 1
* , and the equilibrium is given
by the intersection between the labor demand curve and the upper segment of the




























·  If the demand is “large” relative to the supply, the Tayloristic organizations hire all
the available non-versatile and versatile workers. Then the equilibrium is given by






















4c. The Labor Market Equilibrium and Labor Market Segmentation
A simple explicit solution for the labor market equilibrium may be obtained if
we linearize the labor demand and wage setting curves at the labor market equilibrium
point. (None of our qualitative conclusions depend on this linearization, however.)
Specifically, for positive constants gH and gT, let the aggregate holistic and Tayloristic
labor demands
22 be  LF aw H
D
HH H H =× ××- 2 gbg  and  L F a w T
D
T T T T = × × × - 2 g b g.
Regarding the scenarios in which the wage setting curves help determine the labor
market equilibrium, let the holistic wage setting curve (when the labor demand is




- da b / ch , for a positive constant d ,
and let the Tayloristic wage setting curve be wL r T
o
T
D =- × +
- da b /1 bg ch  when the






* 1 c h di  when there is
an “intermediate” demand.
Then, in the holistic Scenario 1H (a “small” holistic demand), the equilibrium
employment-wage combination is
                                                
22Linearizing these labor demand implies holding constant the second partial derivatives of the output
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Given these two alternative equilibria, the Tayloristic equilibrium employment-wage
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The  ML L HT
** * =- - 1  workers who do not find employment in the holistic or
Tayloristic organizations are relegated to the “tertiary sector” in which people receive
their reservation wage r = r
-, either by doing low-grade work or remaining
unemployed.
In short, the labor market is segmented into a “high-wage” holistic sector, a
“medium-wage” Tayloristic sector, and a “low-wage” tertiary sector. It is on this
account that the process whereby Tayloristic firms are restructured into holistic ones
has profound effects on labor market segmentation, as we shall show in Section 6.REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 24
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The labor market equilibrium above is derived for a given number of holistic
and Tayloristic organizations. We now examine the market for these organizations.
5. Equilibrium in the Market for Organizations
To model the restructuring process and determine the equilibrium number of
holistic and Tayloristic organizations, we distinguish between three sets of fixed costs:
(i) the fixed costs expended by incumbent firms in order to remain in operation: the
positive constants fH and fT for the holistic and Tayloristic organizations,
respectively.
(ii) the fixed costs of reorganization: fH  + rTH  for a Tayloristic organization to turn
into a holistic one and fT  + rHT for a holistic firm to turn into a Tayloristic one (where
rTH and rHT are positive constants); and
(iii) the fixed costs of entry: fH  + qH to enter the holistic sector and fT  + qT to enter
the Tayloristic one (where qH and qT are positive constants).
Let the equilibrium gross profit - viz, profit not including the fixed costs - of
each incumbent Tayloristic and holistic organization be
23
py iii ii i i i i i qw nW N n N i T H
** * * * * ,, =- - - - = ch ch Y (17a)
For the linearized labor demand and wage setting equations of Section 4c, this gross
profit function may, after the appropriate substitutions, be expressed as
pg y g i i ii i i ii i fw aw aw iT H
*** * ', , =× - × × - - × - = 2ch ch ch di (17b)
where  f ' is the constant marginal product of labor, and where the equilibrium wages
depend positively on the number of firms (for the greater the number of firms, the
greater is the demand for labor relative to the given wage setting curve), as shown in
equations (S1H-S2H, S1T-S3T).
Let the equilibrium net profit of each incumbent Tayloristic and holistic
organization be
Pii i iT H
**,, =- = pf (7”)
                                                
23Here the “
*” stands for the labor market equilibrium value.REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 25
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Along the same lines, let the equilibrium net profits accruing to Tayloristic
organizations that restructure into holistic ones (PTH
* ) and to holistic organizations
that restructure into Tayloristic ones (PHT
* ) be
PTH H H TH
** =-- pfr (18T)
PHT T T HT
** =-- pfr (18H)
Finally, let the equilibrium net profits new entrants - viz, newly created
Tayloristic organizations (PET
* ) and holistic ones (PEH
* ) be
PE T TTT
** =-- pfq (19T)
PE H HHH
** =-- pfq (19H)
Figure 4 describes a range of equilibria in the market for organizations. On the
horizontal axis, the number of Tayloristic organizations is measured from left to right,
while the number of holistic organizations is measured from right to left. The profit
curves PP P HT H E H
** * , , and   for each holistic scenario (given by a “large” and “small”
demand for versatile workers) are downward sloping, as seen from the right-hand
origin.The reason is that, in Figure 3, if the number of holistic firms increases, the
aggregate holistic labor demand curveLH
D  shifts upwards, first along the holistic wage
setting curve WSH and eventually along the aggregate holistic labor supply curve LH
S .
In both cases, the equilibrium holistic wage wH
*  rises. As result, the gross profit p H
*
of each holistic firm falls. For expositional simplicity, the figure depicts these curves
for only a single scenario (it does not matter which).
24 For the same reason, the profit
curves PP P TH T E T
** * , , and   in Figure 4 are all downward sloping, as seen from the left-
hand origin, in each of the three scenarios.
25
We assume that the costs of entry exceed the costs of reorganization
(thusqr HT H >  and qr TH T > ). For this reason the PH
*  curve lies above the PTH
*
curve, which in turn lies above the PEH
*  curve, and similarly for the
PP P TH T E T
** * , , and   curves.
Entry into the holistic organization market proceeds until the profit of the
entrant is reduced to zero:
                                                
24The transition from one scenario to another would introduce a kink into the each profit curve.
25Again, the figure depicts only a single scenario.REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 26
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PEH
* = 0 (20H)
For example, for the linearized labor demand and wage setting equations, this zero
profit condition is
20 ×-××- - ×- --= fw a w a w HHH H H HH H HH '





































in the Scenario 1H and 2H, respectively. The value FF H H = which fulfills this
condition may be called the “minimum sustainable number of holistic organizations”,
since any smaller number would induce the entry of new holistic organizations, as
shown in Figure 4.
The entry condition for the Tayloristic organization market is
PET
* = 0 (20T)
The value FF T T = which fulfills this condition may  be termed the  “minimum
sustainable number of Tayloristic organizations”, also pictured in Figure 4.
Reorganization of Tayloristic organizations into holistic ones proceeds until the
profit from continuing to operate a Tayloristic organization is equal to that from
transforming into a holistic one:
PP TT H
** = (21T)





=× - × × - - × - - -
f w aw aw
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in Scenarios 1T, 2T, and 3T, respectively. The value FF TT =  which fulfills the
reorganization condition may be called the “maximum sustainable number of
Tayloristic organizations”, since any greater number would induce Tayloristic
organizations to transform into holistic ones.
Similarly, the holistic reorganization condition is
PP HH T
** = (21H)
and FH  is the “maximum sustainable number of holistic organizations”.
The market for organizations is in equilibrium whenever the number of holistic
organizations lies between its maximum and minimum sustainable levels and
similarly for the number of Tayloristic organizations:
FF F H HH ££
*   and   FFF T TT ££
* (22)
In the figure, for example, every combination ( , )
** FF HT  lying within the interval
between FT  and FH  in the figure may be an organizational equilibrium.
26
Beginning from such an equilibrium, the next section investigates the forces
inducing reorganization and entry into the holistic sector and explores the implications
of these developments for the labor market.
6. The Restructuring Process
We now analyze how the major forces driving the restructuring process -
advances in production and information technologies, and improvements in human
capital, discussed in Sections 1 and 2 - influence labor market activity.
6a. Advances in Production and Information Technologies
We consider two types of sustained advances in production and information
technologies: ones that increase the technological and informational task
complementarities (as described in Section 2) and ones that reduce the holistic fixed
cost fH (while the Tayloristic fixed cost fT remains unchanged). These changes can be
shown to have qualitatively similar effects in our model. Specifically, they cause the
                                                
26There is of course no reason why the FH   point should necessarily lie to the left of the FT  point, or
why the FH  point should necessarily lie to the left of the FT  point.REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 28
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profit  curves PP P HT H E H
** * , , and   in Figure 4 to rise period by period, while the profit
curves  PP P TH T E T
** * , ,  and   remain unchanged. If the economy is initially in an
organizational equilibrium, in which condition (22) holds, then it eventually will
become worthwhile for Tayloristic organizations to be restructured as holistic ones (so
that the restructuring condition (21T) becomes binding) and/or new holistic firms to
enter (so that the entry condition (20H) becomes binding).
For the linearized labor demand and wage setting equations, a fall in the holistic
fixed cost fH and advances in the holistic production and information technologies -
represented by increases in aH - raise the profit from restructuring into a holistic
organization,  PTH H H H H H H H H H TH f w aw aw
** * * ' =× - × × - - × - - - 2ch c h c h di gy g f r ,
relative to the profit from remaining a Tayloristic organization,
PT T TT T T TT T f w aw aw
** * * ' =× - × × - - × - 2ch ch ch di gy g, from equation (21Ta). To fix
ideas, let us assume that this restructuring condition is binding in the initial
equilibrium, so that the technological changes above lead some Tayloristic firms to
turn into holistic ones. Furthermore, assume that if the restructuring condition (21Ta)
and the entry condition (20H) are both binding, then restructuring takes place before
entry.
27 Then the changes above lead to a rise in the equilibrium number of holistic
organizations F
*





In terms of Figure 5, this means that the profit curve of the restructured
organizations, P
*
TH,  rises to P’TH, while the profit curve of incumbent Tayloristic
organizations, PT
* , remains unchanged. As result, the intersection between these two
curves shifts to the left, increasing the number of holistic organizations and reducing
the number of Tayloristic ones.
The labor market implications of this change are straightforward. The increase
in the number of holistic organizations shifts the holistic labor demand curve upwards
in Figure 3. Consequently, as the holistic equilibrium equations (S1H’) and (S2H’)
                                                
27Recall that the costs of restructuring assumed to be lower than the cost of entry.
28This raises the equilibrium holistic wage w
*
H relative to the equilibrium Tayloristic wage w
*
T, and
thereby brings the profit of the restructured organizations (P
*
TH) back into equality with the profit of the
incumbent Tayloristic organizations (P
*
TH).REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 29
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show, the equilibrium holistic wage rises and the equilibrium level of aggregate
holistic employment rises as well, provided that the supply of versatile workers has
not been exhausted.
29
The fall in the number of Tayloristic organizations F
*
T, associated with the rise
in the number of holistic organizations F
*
H, reduces the equilibrium aggregate
Tayloristic employment and also reduces the equilibrium Tayloristic wage, as shown
in the Tayloristic equilibrium equations (S1T’)-(S3T’). If the number of non-versatile
workers is sufficiently large to satisfy the Tayloristic labor demand (Scenario S1),
then the fall in Tayloristic employment is driven solely by the fall in the number of
Tayloristic organizations. Yet if the number of non-versatile workers is small enough
to make it necessary for the Tayloristic organizations to hire some versatile workers
(Scenarios S2 and S3), then the employment decline in the Tayloristic sector is also
driven by the rise in the number of holistic organizations, which reduces the labor
supply to the Tayloristic organizations and shifts the wage setting equation upwards
(since the reservation wage rises from r
- to r
+).
In terms of Figure 3, the Tayloristic labor demand curve shifts downwards, and
the Tayloristic labor supply curve shifts to the left. If the number of non-versatile
workers is large (Scenario 1T), the Tayloristic equilibrium lies at the intersection of
the labor demand curve and the lower segment of the wage setting curve, and then
equilibrium employment and the wage in the Tayloristic sector both fall. If, on the
other hand, the number of non-versatile workers is small (Scenarios 2T and 3T), the
Tayloristic equilibrium lies at the intersection of the labor demand curve and the upper
segment of the wage setting curve, and then the Tayloristic wage setting curve will
shift upwards in response to the rise in holistic employment. As result, Tayloristic
employment will fall by more and the Tayloristic wage will fall by less than in
Scenario 1T.
The change in the number of “disadvantaged” workers, relegated to
unemployment or a tertiary labor market, depends on the magnitude of the rise in
holistic employment relative to the fall in Tayloristic employment. Assuming that
employment per Tayloristic organization exceeds the employment per holistic
                                                
29If, however, the aggregate holistic labor demand is “large”, aggregate employment is of course equal
to the supply of versatile workers.REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 30
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organization and that the unemployment rate among single-skill workers exceeds that
among the versatile ones, the rise in aggregate holistic employment will be less than
the corresponding fall in Tayloristic employment, and hence the number of
disadvantaged workers rises.
As technological progress continues to increase the technological and
informational task complementarities and to reduce the fixed costf H  period by
period, the restructuring of Tayloristic into holistic organizations will eventually be
replaced by entry of new holistic organizations. In terms of our model, this means that
the entry condition (20H) becomes binding, replacing the restructuring condition
(20T).
It is easy to see why. Given the number of holistic and Tayloristic organizations,
the technological progress above raises an organization’s profit from entry into the
holistic sector by the same amount as the profit from restructuring a Tayloristic
organization into a holistic one, since the gross holistic profit (p H
* ) remains
unchanged. But as the number of holistic organizations increases, an organization’s
profit from entry into the holistic sector falls at a slower rate than the profit from
restructuring a Tayloristic organization into a holistic one. The reason is that, as the
restructuring process reduces the number of Tayloristic organizations, the profit of
each remaining incumbent Tayloristic organization rises (since the wage in the
Tayloristic sector falls), and this provides a disincentive to restructure. There is no
corresponding disincentive to enter the holistic sector.
This is illustrated in Figure 5. Here we consider an initial equilibrium at Point
A, where the marginal organization entering the holistic sector makes zero profit, and
the marginal Tayloristic organization that restructures into a holistic one makes zero
profit as well. Then the technological change raises the profit curve PEH
*   by the same
amount as the profit curve PTH
* . Thus, the magnitude of the upward shift from
PP EH EH
*'  to   in the figure is equal to the magnitude of the upward shift of the profit
curve from PP TH TH
*'  to  .REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 31
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Assuming, as above, that restructuring takes place before entry,
30 the
restructuring process moves the economy from Point A to B in the figure (i.e. the
number of holistic organizations increases by AB and the number of Tayloristic
organizations falls by an equal amount). But at Point B there are still positive profits
to be made from entering the holistic sector. The reason is that the intersection of the
profit curve PEH with the horizontal axis shifts to the left by a larger amount (from
Point A to C) than the intersection of the profit curve PTH with the profit curve PT
(from Point A to Point B). Consequently, the number of holistic organizations
increases by DFH
*  = BC in the figure. Since the aggregate number of organizations has
increased by DFH
* , the left-hand vertical axis shifts leftwards by an equal amount,
pulling the Tayloristic incumbent organization’s profit curve leftwards by an equal
amount as well (from PP TT
*'  to   in the figure).
At Point C, however, the profit from restructuring a Tayloristic into a holistic
organization (given by PTH
' ) is less than the profit from remaining a Tayloristic
organization (given by PT
' ). Thus when the technological progress in the following
period shifts the holistic profit curves upwards again, only entry into the holistic sector
- but no restructuring - will take place.
Proposition 3: In sum, technological advances that increase the technological and
information task complementarities and reduce the fixed cost of operating holistic
organizations, have the following effects on labor market segmentation:
(a) In the “restructuring phase”, in which Tayloristic organizations are
transformed into holistic ones: the high-wage holistic sector expands, the medium-
wage Tayloristic sector contracts, and the low-wage tertiary sector or unemployment
expands.
 (b) In the “entry phase”, in which new holistic organizations enter the
economy: the high-wage holistic sector continues to expand, the medium-wage
Tayloristic sector remains constant, and the low-wage tertiary sector, or
unemployment, contracts.
                                                
30If entry takes place before restructuring, then it can be shown that the number of holistic firms
increases by AC and no restructuring takes place at all.REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 32
32
In the restructuring phase there is increasing labor market segmentation,
characterized by increasing wage dispersion and growing inequality of employment
opportunities. This is compounded by the rise of the holistic wage relative to the
Tayloristic wage through time. The entry phase is characterized by less labor market
segmentation in the special sense that the high-wage employment opportunities grow
at the expense of the low-wage ones, but since the holistic wage rises through time,
there is still increasing wage dispersion.
6b. Improvements in Human Capital
We model education-induced improvements in human capital through an
increased supply of versatile workers. This may be interpreted as “general training”
acquired at school and college, leading to skills that are potentially useful to all firms.
The effects of this training in our theory turn out to be quite different from those in the
standard human capital theory. In the latter, general training raises wages in all firms
since it raises workers’ productivity all over the economy. In our theory, by contrast,
general training increases the supply of labor to holistic organizations and thereby
expands the holistic sector at the expense of the Tayloristic one and reduces holistic
wages relative to Tayloristic ones.
An increase in the supply of versatile workers LH
S =× ab  leads to a rise in the
equilibrium level of holistic employment and a fall in the equilibrium holistic wage, as
shown by equations (S1H’) and (S2H’). In terms of Figure 3, the increased supply of
versatile workers shifts the holistic labor supply curve LT
S to the left and thus shifts
the wage setting curve WSH  leftward, so that aggregate holistic employment rises
while the holistic wage falls.
The fall in the holistic wage implies that the gross profit of each holistic
organization rises. Thus the holistic profit curves in Figure 4 shift upwards. This
process continues until the restructuring condition (20T) becomes binding and thus
some Tayloristic organizations turn into holistic ones. As shown in Section 6a, the
restructuring reduces aggregate Tayloristic employment and further increasesREORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 33
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aggregate holistic employment. In the process, the Tayloristic wage falls and the
holistic wage rises (reversing its initial fall).
Under the assumptions of Section 6a,
31 the rise in aggregate holistic
employment is less than the fall in aggregate Tayloristic employment, and
consequently the restructuring process leads to a rise in the number of workers
relegated to the tertiary sector or to unemployment.
Eventually, as described in Section 7a, this restructuring condition is replaced by
the entry condition (20H), and the restructuring process stops and new holistic
organizations enter the labor market. Then the tertiary sector or unemployment  will
contract. In sum,
Proposition 4: General training that increases the number of versatile workers affects
labor market segmentation in the following way:
(a) In the “restructuring phase”: the high-wage holistic sector expands, the
medium-wage Tayloristic sector contracts, and the low-wage tertiary sector or
unemployment expands.
 (b) In the “entry phase”: the high-wage holistic sector continues to expand, the
medium-wage Tayloristic sector remains constant, and the low-wage tertiary sector
or unemployment contracts.
The net consequences for relative wage depends, of course, on the degree to
which the supply of versatile workers increases relative to the holistic labor demand
on account of restructuring and entry. Here, once again, any rise in labor market
segmentation during the restructuring phase is reduced in the entry phase.
7. Concluding remarks
This  paper has analyzed the contemporary restructuring of organizations and
work, emphasizing the rise of multi-tasking and work-rotation in this process. We
have focused on two driving forces behind the reorganization process, namely (i)
advances in information and production technologies that favor holistic organizations,
and (ii) increases in the supply of employees with general human capital, permitting
them to perform multiple tasks and to exploit the technological advances above.
                                                
31The assumptions are that employment per holistic firm is less than employment per Tayloristic one
and the unemployment rate among non-versatile workers exceeds that among versatile workers.REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 34
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The quantitative importance of these new organizational developments is still an
open question.  But from reading the literature in the field and from observing what is
happening within a great number of firms nowadays, we have little doubt that a
dramatic and broadly based process of organizational change, of the type discussed in
this paper, has been underway for some time, and is likely to continue.
Our analysis shows that in an early “restructuring phase,” some Tayloristic
organizations are transformed into holistic ones and the tertiary sector (including low-
grade, low-wage work and unemployment) expands. The result is rising labor market
segmentation in the sense of greater inequality of employment opportunities.  Whether
there is also increased wage dispersion depends on whether the restructuring process
is driven by the technological advances or by improvements in human capital. In a
later “entry phase”, dominated by the entry of new holistic organizations, the
Tayloristic sector stops contracting  and the tertiary sector stops contracts. Here the
labor market segmentation can be expected to subside, in the sense that high-wage
employment opportunities now grow at the expense of employment in the tertiary
sector.
The paper provides a possible explanation for the growth of female employment
relative to that of males and the narrowing of the male-female wage differentials in
many advanced industrial countries over the past decade. Women may often have a
comparative - and perhaps even absolute - advantage relative to men for work in
holistic organizations. Physical strength is less important in such organizations, while
verbal ability, general social competence and the ability to pursue multi-task activities
tend to be more important. (After all, females have for long periods of time been
engaged in multi-task activities in the household, while men have usually been more
specialized - as early as when they were hunters.) Our analysis thereby provides an
organizational rationale for the improving fortunes of women in the labor market.
In providing a theory of multi-tasking and the reorganization of work, our
analysis may be viewed as a contribution to the contemporary debate on the sources of
the increased dispersion of wages and job opportunities in the US and Europe. The
dominant hypotheses thus far have been that these phenomena are the outcome of (a)REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 35
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skill-biased technological change,
 32 (b) skill-biased international trade flows,
 33  and
(c) deficient education and training.
 34 However these hypotheses explain neither the
widening inequality of wages within education, occupation, and job tenure groups in
the US and the UK, nor the widening inequality of employment opportunities within
these groups in various European countries. Our analysis offers another explanation,
based on the reorganization of firms. In so doing, it goes further than the hypotheses
above by specifying how changes in production and information technologies and how
education and training may be expected to affect the dispersion of wages and
employment opportunities in the context of organizational restructuring. Our analysis
is also complementary with the hypothesis resting on international trade, since the
expansion of trade has enabled an increasing number of firms in the advanced
industrialized countries to shift to products and production processes requiring holistic
organization, while contracting out the routine, assembly line work to other countries.
Finally, since people within particular education, occupation, and job tenure groups
are likely to vary considerably in terms of their social competence, judgment, and
ability to perform multiple tasks, our analysis also suggests an explanation for the
widening dispersion of wages and job opportunities within these groups.
                                                
32See, for example, Berman, Bound and Grilleches (1993), Bound and Johnson (1992), Krueger (1993),
Machin (1994),  and Mincer (1989, 1991).
33See, for example, Leamer (1994, 1995) and Sachs and Schatz (1994).
34See, for example, Mincer (1991), Levy and Murname (1992), and Katz and Blanchflower (1992),
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